I have a Ph.D. in a field of mathematics in which complex numbers are fundamental, but I have a real philosophical problem with complex numbers. In particular, they arose historically as a tool for solving polynomial equations. Is this the shadow of something natural that we just couldn't see, or just a convenience?
As the "evidence" piles up, in further mathematics, physics, and the interactions of the two, I still never got to the point at the core where I thought complex numbers were a certain fundamental concept, or just a convenient tool for expressing and calculating a variety of things. It's more than just a coincidence, for sure, but the philosophical part of my mind is not at ease with it.
I doubt anyone could make a reply to this comment that would make me feel any better about it. Indeed, I believe real numbers to be completely natural, but far greater mathematicians than I found them objectionable only a hundred years ago, and demonstrated that mathematics is rich and nuanced even when you assume that they don't exist in the form we think of them today.
One way to sharpen the question is to stop asking whether C is "fundamental" and instead ask whether it is forced by mild structural constraints. From that angle, its status looks closer to inevitability than convenience.
Take R as an ordered field with its usual topology and ask for a finite-dimensional, commutative, unital R-algebra that is algebraically closed and admits a compatible notion of differentiation with reasonable spectral behavior. You essentially land in C, up to isomorphism. This is not an accident, but a consequence of how algebraic closure, local analyticity, and linearization interact. Attempts to remain over R tend to externalize the complexity rather than eliminate it, for example by passing to real Jordan forms, doubling dimensions, or encoding rotations as special cases rather than generic elements.
More telling is the rigidity of holomorphicity. The Cauchy-Riemann equations are not a decorative constraint; they encode the compatibility between the algebra structure and the underlying real geometry. The result is that analyticity becomes a global condition rather than a local one, with consequences like identity theorems and strong maximum principles that have no honest analogue over R.
I’m also skeptical of treating the reals as categorically more natural. R is already a completion, already non-algebraic, already defined via exclusion of infinitesimals. In practice, many constructions over R that are taken to be primitive become functorial or even canonical only after base change to C.
So while one can certainly regard C as a technical device, it behaves like a fixed point: impose enough regularity, closure, and stability requirements, and the theory reconstructs it whether you intend to or not. That does not make it metaphysically fundamental, but it does make it mathematically hard to avoid without paying a real structural cost.
This is the way I think. C is "nice" because it is constructed to satisfy so many "nice" structural properties simultaneously; that's what makes it special. This gives rise to "nice" consequences that are physically convenient across a variety of applications.
I work in applied probability, so I'm forced to use many different tools depending on the application. My colleagues and I would consider ourselves lucky if what we're doing allows for an application of some properties of C, as the maths will tend to fall out so beautifully.
A long time ago on HN, I said that I didn't like complex numbers, and people jumped all over my case. Today I don't think that there's anything wrong with them, I just get a code smell from them because I don't know if there's a more fundamental way of handling placeholder variables.
I get the same feeling when I think about monads, futures/promises, reactive programming that doesn't seem to actually watch variables (React.. cough), Rust's borrow checker existing when we have copy-on-write, that there's no realtime garbage collection algorithm that's been proven to be fundamental (like Paxos and Raft were for distributed consensus), having so many types of interprocess communication instead of just optimizing streams and state transfer, having a myriad of GPU frameworks like Vulkan/Metal/DirectX without MIMD multicore processors to provide bare-metal access to the underlying SIMD matrix math, I could go on forever.
I can talk about why tau is superior to pi (and what a tragedy it is that it's too late to rewrite textbooks) but I have nothing to offer in place of i. I can, and have, said a lot about the unfortunate state of computer science though: that internet lottery winners pulled up the ladder behind them rather than fixing fundamental problems to alleviate struggle.
I wonder if any of this is at play in mathematics. It sure seems like a lot of innovation comes from people effectively living in their parents' basements, while institutions have seemingly unlimited budgets to reinforce the status quo..
The author mentioned that the theory of the complex field is categorical, but I didn't see them directly mention that the theory of the real field isn't - for every cardinal there are many models of the real field of that size. My own, far less qualified, interpretation, is that even if the complex field is just a convenient tool for organizing information, for algebraic purposes it is as
safe an abstraction as we could really hope for - and actually much more so than the real field.
The real field is categorically characterized (in second-order logic) as the unique complete ordered field, proved by Huntington in 1903. The complex field is categorically characterized as the unique algebraic closure of the real field, and also as the unique algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 and size continuum. I believe that you are speaking of the model-theoretic first-order notion of categoricity-in-a-cardinal, which is different than the categoricity remarks made in the essay.
A question I enjoy asking myself when I'm wondering about this stuff is "if there are alien mathematicians in a distant galaxy somewhere, do they know about this?"
For complex numbers my gut feeling is yes, they do.
1. Algebra: Let's say we have a linear operator T on a real vector space V. When trying to analyze a linear operator, a key technique is to determine the T-invariant subspaces (these are subspaces W such that TW is a subset of W). The smallest non-trivial T-invariant subspaces are always 1- or 2-dimensional(!). The first case corresponds to eigenvectors, and T acts by scaling by a real number. In the second case, there's always a basis where T acts by scaling and rotation. The set of all such 2D scaling/rotation transformations are closed under addition, multiplication, and the nonzero ones are invertible. This is the complex numbers! (Correspondence: use C with 1 and i as the basis vectors, then T:C->C is determined by the value of T(1).)
2. Topology: The fact the complex numbers are 2D is essential to their fundamentality. One way I think about it is that, from the perspective of the real numbers, multiplication by -1 is a reflection through 0. But, from an "outside" perspective, you can rotate the real line by 180 degrees, through some ambient space. Having a 2D ambient space is sufficient. (And rotating through an ambient space feels more physically "real" than reflecting through 0.) Adding or multiplying by nonzero complex numbers can always be performed as a continuous transformation inside the complex numbers. And, given a number system that's 2D, you get a key topological invariant of closed paths that avoid the origin: winding number. This gives a 2D version of the Intermediate Value Theorem: If you have a continuous path between two closed loops with different winding numbers, then one of the intermediate closed loops must pass through 0. A consequence to this is the fundamental theorem of algebra, since for a degree-n polynomial f, when r is large enough then f(r*e^(i*t)) traces out for 0<=t<=2*pi a loop with winding number n, and when r=0 either f(0)=0 or f(r*e^(i*t)) traces out a loop with winding number 0, so if n>0 there's some intermediate r for which there's some t such that f(r*e^(i*t))=0.
So, I think the point is that 2D rotations and going around things are natural concepts, and very physical. Going around things lets you ensnare them. A side effect is that (complex) polynomials have (complex) roots.
For me, the complex numbers arise as the quotients of 2-dimensional vectors (which arise as translations of the 2-dimensional affine space). This means that complex numbers are equivalence classes of pairs of vectors is a 2-dimesional vector space, like 2-dimensional vectors are equivalence classes of pairs of points in a 2-dimensional affine space or rational numbers are equivalence classes of pairs of integers, or integers are equivalence classes of pairs of natural numbers, which are equivalence classes of equipotent sets.
When you divide 2 collinear 2-dimensional vectors, their quotient is a real number a.k.a. scalar. When the vectors are not collinear, then the quotient is a complex number.
Multiplying a 2-dimensional vector with a complex number changes both its magnitude and its direction. Multiplying by +i rotates a vector by a right angle. Multiplying by -i does the same thing but in the opposite sense of rotation, hence the difference between them, which is the difference between clockwise and counterclockwise. Rotating twice by a right angle arrives in the opposite direction, regardless of the sense of rotation, therefore i*i = (-i))*(-i) = -1.
Both 2-dimensional vectors and complex numbers are included in the 2-dimensional geometric algebra, whose members have 2^2 = 4 components, which are the 2 components of a 2-dimensional vector together with the 2 components of a complex number. Unlike the complex numbers, the 2-dimensional vectors are not a field, because if you multiply 2 vectors the result is not a vector. All the properties of complex numbers can be deduced from those of the 2-dimensional vectors, if the complex numbers are defined as quotients, much in the same way how the properties of rational numbers are deduced from the properties of integers.
A similar relationship like that between 2-dimensional vectors and complex numbers exists between 3-dimensional vectors and quaternions. Unfortunately the discoverer of the quaternions, Hamilton, has been confused by the fact that both vectors and quaternions have multiple components and he believed that vectors and quaternions are the same thing. In reality, vectors and quaternions are distinct things and the operations that can be done with them are very different. This confusion has prevented for many years during the 19th century the correct use of quaternions and vectors in physics (like also the confusion between "polar" vectors and "axial" vectors a.k.a. pseudovectors).
I have MS in math and came to a conclusion that C is not any more "imaginary" than R. Both are convenient abstractions, neither is particularly "natural".
We have too much mental baggage about what a "number" is.
Real numbers function as magnitudes or objects, while complex numbers function as coordinatizations - a way of packaging structure that exists independently of them, e.g. rotations in SO(2) together with scaling). Complex numbers are a choice of coordinates on structure that exists independently of them. They are bookkeeping (a la double‑entry accounting) not money
I don't know if this will help, but I believe that all of mathematics arises from an underlying fundamental structure to the universe and that this results in it both being "discoverable" (rather than invented) and "useful" (as in helpful for describing, expressing and calculating things).
There are legitimate questions if physical constants are constant everywhere in the universe, and also whether they are constant over time. Just because we conceive something "should" be a certain way doesn't make it true. The zero and negative numbers were also weird yet valid. How is the structure of mathematics different from fundamental constants, which we also cannot prove are invariant.
Complex numbers are just a field over 2D vectors, no? When you find "complex solutions to an equation", you're not working with a real equation anymore, you're working in C. I hate when people talk about complex zeroes like they're a "secret solution", because you're literally not talking about the same equation anymore.
There's this lack of rigor where people casually move "between" R and C as if a complex number without an imaginary component suddenly becomes a real number, and it's all because of this terrible "a + bi" notation. It's more like (a, b). You can't ever discard that second component, it's always there.
We identify the real number 2 with the rational number 2 with the integer 2 with the natural number 2. It does not seem so strange to also identify the complex number 2 with those.
If you say "this function f operates on the integers", you can't turn around and then go "ooh but it has solutions in the rationals!" No it doesn't, it doesn't exist in that space.
In my view nonnegative real numbers have good physical representations: amount, size, distance, position. Even negative integers don't have this types of models for them. Negative numbers arise mostly as a tool for accounting, position on a directed axis, things that cancel out each other (charge). But in each case it is the structure of <R,+> and not <R,+,*> and the positive and negative values are just a convention. Money could be negative, and debt could be positive, everything would be the same. Same for electrons and protons.
So in our everyday reality I think -1 and i exist the same way. I also think that complex numbers are fundamental/central in math, and in our world. They just have so many properties and connections to everything.
> In my view nonnegative real numbers have good physical representations
In my view, that isn’t even true for nonnegative integers. What’s the physical representation of the relatively tiny (compared to ‘most integers’) Graham’s number (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham's_number)?
Back to the reals: in your view, do reals that cannot be computed have good physical representations?
Good catch. Some big numbers are way too big to mean anything physical, or exist in any sense. (Up to our everyday experiences at least. Maybe in a few years, after the singularity, AI proves that there are infinite many small discrete structures and proves ultrafinitist mathematics false.)
I think these questions mostly only matter when one tries to understand their own relation to these concepts, as GP asked.
As a math enjoyer who got burnt out on higher math relatively young, I have over time wondered if complex numbers aren’t just a way to represent an n-dimensional concept in n-1 dimensions.
Which makes me wonder if complex numbers that show up in physics are a sign there are dimensions we can’t or haven’t detected.
I saw a demo one time of a projection of a kind of fractal into an additional dimension, as well as projections of Sierpinski cubes into two dimensions. Both blew my mind.
> Is this the shadow of something natural that we just couldn't see, or just a convenience?
They originally arose as tool, but complex numbers are fundamental to quantum physics. The wave function is complex, the Schrödinger equation does not make sense without them. They are the best description of reality we have.
The schroedinger equation could be rewritten as two coupled equations without the need for complex numbers. Complex numbers just simplify things and "beautify it", but there is nothing "fundamental" about it, its just representation.
How does your question differ from the classic question more normally applied to maths in general - does it exist outside the mind (eg platonism) or no (eg. nominalism)?
If it doesn't differ, you are in the good company of great minds who have been unable to settle this over thousands of years and should therefore feel better!
I like to think of complex numbers as “just” the even subset of the two dimensional geometric algebra.
Almost every other intuition, application, and quirk of them just pops right out of that statement. The extensions to the quarternions, etc… all end up described by a single consistent algebra.
It’s as if computer graphics was the first and only application of vector and matrix algebra and people kept writing articles about “what makes vectors of three real numbers so special?” while being blithely unaware of the vast space that they’re a tiny subspace of.
Maybe the bottom ~1/3, starting at "The complex field as a problem for singular terms", would be helpful to you. It gives a philosophical view of what we mean when we talk about things like the complex numbers, grounded in mathematical practice.
When it doesn't, we yearn for something that will fill the void so that it does. It's like that note you yearn for in a musical piece that the composer seems to avoid. One yearns for a resolution of the tension.
Personally, no number is natural. They are probably a human construct. Mathematics does not come naturally to a human. Nowadays, it seems like every child should be able to do addition, but it was not the case in the past. The integers, rationals, and real numbers are a convenience, just like the complex numbers.
A better way to understand my point is: we need mental gymnastics to convert problems into equations. The imaginary unit, just like numbers, are a by-product of trying to fit problems onto paper. A notable example is Schrodinger's equation.
The complex numbers is just the ring such that there is an element where the element multiplied by itself is the inverse of the multiplicative identity. There are many such structures in the universe.
For example, reflections and chiral chemical structures. Rotations as well.
It turns out all things that rotate behave the same, which is what the complex numbers can describe.
Polynomial equations happen to be something where a rotation in an orthogonal dimension leaves new answers.
First, let's try differential equations, which are also the point of calculus:
Idea 1: The general study of PDEs uses Newton(-Kantorovich)'s method, which leads to solving only the linear PDEs,
which can be held to have constant coefficients over small regions, which can be made into homogeneous PDEs,
which are often of order 2, which are either equivalent to Laplace's equation, the heat equation,
or the wave equation. Solutions to Laplace's equation in 2D are the same as holomorphic functions.
So complex numbers again.
Now algebraic closure, but better:
Idea 2: Infinitary algebraic closure. Algebraic closure can be interpeted as saying that any rational functions can be factorised into monomials.
We can think of the Mittag-Leffler Theorem and Weierstrass Factorisation Theorem as asserting that this is true also for meromorphic functions,
which behave like rational functions in some infinitary sense. So the algebraic closure property of C holds in an infinitary sense as well.
This makes sense since C has a natural metric and a nice topology.
Next, general theory of fields:
Idea 3: Fields of characteristic 0. Every algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 is isomorphic to R[√-1] for some real-closed field R.
The Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem says that every FOL statement featuring only the functions {+, -, ×, ÷} which is true over the reals is
also true over every real-closed field.
I think maybe differential geometry can provide some help here.
Idea 4: Conformal geometry in 2D. A conformal manifold in 2D is locally biholomorphic to the unit disk in the complex numbers.
Idea 5: This one I'm not 100% sure about. Take a smooth manifold M with a smoothly varying bilinear form B \in T\*M ⊗ T\*M.
When B is broken into its symmetric part and skew-symmetric part, if we assume that both parts are never zero, B can then be seen as an almost
complex structure, which in turn naturally identifies the manifold M as one over C.
I was interested in how it would make sense to define complex numbers without fixing the reals, but I'm not terribly convinced by the method here. It seemed kind of suspect that you'd reduce the complex numbers purely to its field properties of addition and multiplication when these aren't enough to get from the rationals to the reals (some limit-like construction is needed; the article uses Dedekind cuts later on). Anyway, the "algebraic conception" is defined as "up to isomorphism, the unique algebraically closed field of characteristic zero and size continuum", that is, you just declare it has the same size as the reals. And of course now you have no way to tell where π is, since it has no algebraic relation to the distinguished numbers 0 and 1. If I'm reading right, this can be done with any uncountable cardinality with uniqueness up to isomorphism. It's interesting that algebraic closure is enough to get you this far, but with the arbitrary choice of cardinality and all these "wild automorphisms", doesn't this construction just seem... defective?
It feels a bit like the article's trying to extend some legitimate debate about whether fixing i versus -i is natural to push this other definition as an equal contender, but there's hardly any support offered. I expect the last-place 28% poll showing, if it does reflect serious mathematicians at all, is those who treat the topological structure as a given or didn't think much about the implications of leaving it out.
More on not being able to find π, as I'm piecing it together: given only the field structure, you can't construct an equation identifying π or even narrowing it down, because if π is the only free variable then it will work out to finding roots of a polynomial (you only have field operations!) and π is transcendental so that polynomial can only be 0 (if you're allowed to use not-equals instead of equals, of course you can specify that π isn't in various sets of algebraic numbers). With other free variables, because the field's algebraically closed, you can fix π to whatever transcendental you like and still solve for the remaining variables. So it's something like, the rationals plus a continuum's worth of arbitrary field extensions? Not terribly surprising that all instances of this are isomorphic as fields but it's starting to feel about as useful as claiming the real numbers are "up to set isomorphism, the unique set whose cardinality matches the power set of the natural numbers", like, of course it's got automorphisms, you didn't finish defining it.
You need some notion of order or of metric structure if you want to talk about numbers being "close" enough to π. This is related to the property of completeness for the real numbers, which is rather important. Ultimately, the real numbers are also a rigorously defined abstraction for the common notion of approximating some extant but perhaps not fully known quantity.
I really know almost nothing about complex analysis, but this sure feels like what physicists call observational entropy applied to mathematics: what counts as "order" in ℂ depends on the resolution of your observational apparatus.
The algebraic conception, with its wild automorphisms, exhibits a kind of multiplicative chaos — small changes in perspective (which automorphism you apply) cascade into radically different views of the structure. Transcendental numbers are all automorphic with each other; the structure cannot distinguish e from π. Meanwhile, the analytic/smooth conception, by fixing the topology, tames this chaos into something with only two symmetries. The topology acts as a damping mechanism, converting multiplicative sensitivity into additive stability.
I'll just add to that that if transformers are implementing a renormalization group flow, than the models' failure on the automorphism question is predictable: systems trained on compressed representations of mathematical knowledge will default to the conception with the lowest "synchronization" cost — the one most commonly used in practice.
Most commenters are talking about the first part of the post, which lays out how you might construct the complex numbers if you're interested in different properties of them. I think the last bit is the real interesting substance, which is about how to think about things like this in general (namely through structuralism), and why the observations of the first half should not be taken as an argument against structuralism. Very interesting and well written.
It is very re-assuring to know, on a post where I can essentially not even speak the language (despite a masters in engineering) HN is still just discussing the first paragraph of the post.
I began studying 3-manifolds after coming up with a novel way I preferred to draw their presentations. All approaches are formally equivalent, but they impose different cognitive loads in practice. My approach was trivially equivalent to triangulations, or spines, or Heegaard splittings, or ... but I found myself far more nimbly able to "see" 3-manifolds my way.
I showed various colleagues. Each one would ask me to demonstrate the equivalence to their preferred presentation, then assure me "nothing to see here, move along!" that I should instead stick to their convention.
Then I met with Bill Thurston, the most influential topologist of our lifetimes. He had me quickly describe the equivalence between my form and every other known form, effectively adding my node to a complete graph of equivalences he had in his muscle memory. He then suggested some generalizations, and proposed that circle packings would prove to be important to me.
Some mathematicians are smart enough to see no distinction between any of the ways to describe the essential structure of a mathematical object. They see the object.
To be clear, this "disagreement" is about arbitrary naming conventions which can be chosen as needed for the problem at hand. It doesn't make any difference to results.
The author is definitely claiming that it's not just about naming conventions: "These different perspectives ultimately amount, I argue, to mathematically inequivalent structural conceptions of the complex numbers". So you would need to argue against the substance of the article to have a basis for asserting that it is just about naming conventions.
This is a very interesting question, and a great motivator for Galois theory, kind of like a Zen koan. (e.g. "What is the sound of one hand clapping?")
But the question is inherently imprecise. As soon as you make a precise question out of it, that question can be answered trivially.
Generally, the nth roots of 1 form a cyclic group (with complex multiplication, i.e. rotation by multiples of 2pi/n).
One of the roots is 1, choosing either adjacent one as a privileged group generator means choosing whether to draw the same complex plane clockwise or counterclockwise.
The question is meaningless because isomorphic structures should be considered identical. A=A. Unless you happen to be studying the isomorphisms themselves in some broader context, in which case how the structures are identical matters. (For example, the fact that in any expression you can freely switch i with -i is a meaningful claim about how you might work with the complex numbers.)
Homotopy type theory was invented to address this notion of equivalence (eg, under isomorphism) being equivalent to identity; but there’s not a general consensus around the topic — and different formalisms address equivalence versus identity in varied ways.
In the article he says there is a model of ZFC in which the complex numbers have indistinguishable square roots of -1. Thus that model presumably does not allow for a rigid coordinate view of complex numbers.
Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that has a definable complete ordered field ℝ with a definable algebraic closure ℂ, such that the two square roots of −1 in ℂ are set-theoretically indiscernible, even with ordinal parameters.
Haven’t thought it through so I’m quite possibly wrong but it seems to me this implies that in such a situation you can’t have a coordinate view. How can you have two indistinguishable views of something while being able to pick one view?
Mathematicians pick an arbitrary complex number by writing "Let c ∈ ℂ." There are an infinite number of possibilities, but it doesn't matter. They pick the imaginary unit by writing "Let i ∈ ℂ such that i² = −1." There are two possibilities, but it doesn't matter.
If two things are set theoretically indistinguishable then one can’t say “pick one and call it i and the other one -i”. The two sets are the same according to the background set theory.
Names, language, and concepts are essential to and have powerful effects on our understanding of anything, and knowledge of mathematics is much more than the results. Arguably, the results are only tests of what's really important, our understanding.
No the entire point is that it makes difference in the results. He even gave an example in which AI(and most humans imo) picked different interpretation of complex numbers giving different result.
Does anyone have any tips on how I would fundamentally understand this article without just going back to school and getting a degree in mathematics? This is the sort of article where my attempts to understand a term only ever increase the number of terms I don't understand.
Being an engineer by training, I never got exposed to much algebra in my courses (beyond the usual high school stuff in high school). In fact did not miss it much either. Tried to learn some algebraic geometry then... oh the horror. For whatever reason, my intuition is very geometric and analytic (in the calculus sense). Even things like counting and combinatorics, they feel weird, like dry flavorless pretzels made of dried husk. Combinatorics is good only when I can use Calculus. Calculus, oh that's different, it's rich savoury umami buttery briskets. Yum.
That's not the interesting part. The interesting part is that I thought everyone is the same, like me.
It was a big and surprising revelation that people love counting or algebra in just the same way I feel about geometry (not the finite kind) and feel awkward in the kind of mathematics that I like.
It's part of the reason I don't at all get the hate that school Calculus gets. It's so intuitive and beautifully geometric, what's not to like. .. that's usually my first reaction. Usually followed by disappointment and sadness -- oh no they are contemplating about throwing such a beautiful part away.
School calculus is hated because it's typically taught with epsilon delta proofs which is a formalism that happened later in the history of calculus. It's not that intuitive for beginners, especially students who haven't learn any logic to grok existential/universal quantifiers. Historically, mathematics is usually developed by people with little care for complete rigor, then they erase their tracks to make it look pristine. It's no wonder students are like "who the hell came up with all this". Mathematics definitely has an education problem.
Or you can hand wave a bit and trust intuition. Just like the titans who invented it all did!
The obsession with rigor that later developed -- while necessary -- is really an "advanced topic" that shouldn't displace learning the intuition and big picture concepts. I think math up through high school should concentrate on the latter, while still being honest about the hand-waving when it happens.
You can do it with synthetic differential geometry, but that introduces some fiddliness in the underlying logic in order to cope with the fact that eps^2 really "equals" zero for small enough eps, and yet eps is not equal to zero.
calculus works... because it was almost designed for Mechanics. If the machine it's getting input, you have output. When it finished getting input, all the output you get yields some value, yes, but limits are best understood not for the result, but for the process (what the functions do).
You are not sending 0 coins to a machine, do you? You sent X to 0 coins to a machine. The machine will work from 2 to 0, but 0 itself is not included because is not a part of a changing process, it's the end.
Limits are for ranges of quantities over something.
IMO, the calculus is taught incorrectly. It should start with functions and completely avoid sequences initially. Once you understand how calculus exploits continuity (and sometimes smoothness), it becomes almost intuitive. That's also how it was historically developed, until Weierstrass invented his monster function and forced a bit more rigor.
But instead calculus is taught from fundamentals, building up from sequences. And a lot of complexity and hate comes from all those "technical" theorems that you need to make that jump from sequences to functions. E.g. things like "you can pick a converging subsequence from any bounded sequence".
In Maths classes, we started with functions. Functions as list of pairs, functions defined by algebraic expressions, functions plotted on graph papers and after that limits. Sequences were peripherally treated, just so that limits made sense.
Simultaneously, in Physics classes we were being taught using infinitesimals, with the a call back that "you will see this done more formally in your maths classes, but for intuition, infinitesimals will do for now".
Of course everyone agrees that this is a nice way to construct the complex field. The question is what is the structure you are placing on this construction. Is it just a field? Do you intend to fix R as a distinguished subfield? After all, there are many different copies of R in C, if one has only the field structure. Is i named as a constant, as it seems to be in the construction when you form the polynomials in the symbol i. Do you intend to view this as a topological space? Those further questions is what the discussion is about.
I mean, yes of course i is an element in C, because it's a monic polynomial in i.
There's no "intend to". The complex numbers are what they are regardless of us; this isn't quantum mechanics where the presence of an observer somehow changes things.
It's not about observers, but about mathematical structure and meaning. Without answering the questions, you are being ambiguous as to what the structure of C is. For example, if a particular copy of R is fixed as a subfield, then there are only two automorphisms---the trivial automorphism and complex conjugation, since any automorphism fixing the copy of R would have to be the identity on those reals and thus the rest of it is determined by whether i is fixed or sent to -i. Meanwhile, if you don't fix a particular R subfield, then there is a vast space of further wild automorphisms. So this choice of structure---that is, the answer to the questions I posed---has huge consequences on the automorphism group of your conception. You can't just ignore it and refuse to say what the structure is.
The way I think of complex numbers is as linear transformations. Not points but functions on points that rotate and scale. The complex numbers are a particular set of 2x2 matrices, where complex multiplication is matrix multiplication, i.e. function composition. Complex conjugation is matrix transposition. When you think of things this way all the complex matrices and hermitian matrices in physics make a lot more sense. Which group do I fall into?
the title is a bit clickbait - mathematicians don't disagree, all the "conceptions" the article proposes agree with each other. It also seems to conflate the algebraic closure of Q (which would contain the sqrt of -1) and all of the complex numbers by insisting that the former has "size continuum". Once you have "size continuum" then you need some completion to the reals.
anyhow. I'm a bit of an odd one in that I have no problems with imaginary numbers but the reals always seemed a bit unreal to me. that's the real controversy, actually. you can start looking up definable numbers and constructivist mathematics, but that gets to be more philosophy than maths imho.
The square root of any number x is ±y, where +y = (+1)*y = y, and -y = (-1)*y.
So we define i as conforming to ±i = sqrt(-1). The element i itself has no need for a sign, so no sign needs to be chosen. Yet having defined i, we know that that i = (+1)*i = +i, by multiplicative identity.
We now have an unsigned base element for complex numbers i, derived uniquely from the expansion of <R,0,1,+,*> into its own natural closure.
We don't have to ask if i = +i, because it does by definition of the multiplicative identity.
TLDR: Any square root of -1 reduced to a single value, involves a choice, but the definition of unsigned i does not require a choice. It is a unique, unsigned element. And as a result, there is only a unique automorphism, the identity automorphism.
Real men know that infinite sets are just a tool for proving statements in Peano arithmetic, and complex numbers must be endowed with the standard metric structure, as God intended, since otherwise we cannot use them to approximate IEEE 754 floats.
To the ones objecting to "choosing a value of i" I might argue that no such choice is made. i is the square root of -1 and there is only one value of i. When we write -i that is shorthand for (-1)i. Remember the complex numbers are represented by a+bi where a and b are real numbers and i is the square root of -1. We don't bifurcate i into two distinct numbers because the minus sign is associated with b which is one of the real numbers. There is a one-to-one mapping between the complex numbers and these ordered pairs of reals.
You say that i is "the square root of -1", but which one is it? There are two. This is the point in the essay---we cannot tell the difference between i and -i unless we have already agreed on a choice of which square root of -1 we are going to call i. Only then does the other one become -i. How do we know that my i is the same as your i rather than your -i?
To fix the coordinate structure of the complex numbers (a,b) is in effect to have made a choice of a particular i, and this is one of the perspectives discussed in the essay. But it is not the only perspective, since with that perspective complex conjugation should not count as an automorphism, as it doesn't respect the choice of i.
One perspective of the complex numbers is that they are the even subalgebra of the 2D geometric algebra. The "i" is the pseudoscalar of that 2D GA, which is an oriented area.
If you flip the plane and look at it from the bottom, then any formula written using GA operations is identical, but because you're seeing the oriented area of the pseudoscalar from behind, its as if it gains a minus sign in front.
This is equivalent to using a right-handed versus left-handed coordinate systems in 3D. The "rules of physics" remain the same either way, the labels we assign to the coordinate systems are just a convention.
There are 2 square roots of 9, they are 3 and -3. Likewise there are two square roots of -1 which are i and -i. How are people trying to argue that there are two different things called i? We don't ask which 3 right? My argument is that there is only 1 value of i, and the distinction between -i and i is the same as (-1)i and (1)i, which is the same as -3 vs 3. There is only one i. If there are in fact two i's then there are 4 square roots of -1.
Notably, the real numbers are not symmetrical in this way: there are two square roots of 1, but one of them is equal to it and the other is not. (positive) 1 is special because it's the multiplicative identity, whereas i (and -i) have no distinguishing features: it doesn't matter which one you call i and which one you call -i: if you define j = -i, you'll find that anything you can say about i can also be shown to be true about j. That doesn't mean they're equal, just that they don't have any mathematical properties that let you say which one is which.
Your view of the complex numbers is the rigid one. Now suppose you are given a set with two binary operations defined in such a way that the operations behave well with each other. That is you have a ring. Suppose that by some process you are able to conclude that your ring is algebraically equivalent to the complex numbers. How do you know which of your elements in your ring is “i”? There will be two elements that behave like “i” in all algebraic aspects. So you can’t say that this one is “i” and this one is “-i” in a non arbitrary fashion.
There is no way to distinguish between "i" and "-i" unless you choose a representation of C. That is what Galois Theory is about: can you distinguish the roots of a polynomial in a simple algebraic way?
For instance: if you forget the order in Q (which you can do without it stopping being a field), there is no algebraic (no order-dependent) way to distinguish between the two algebraic solutions of x^2 = 2. You can swap each other and you will not notice anything (again, assuming you "forget" the order structure).
Building off of this point, consider the polynomial x^4 + 2x^2 + 2. Over the rationals Q, this is an irreducible polynomial. There is no way to distinguish the roots from each other. There is also no way to distinguish any pair of roots from any other pair.
But over the reals R, this polynomial is not irreducible. There we find that some pairs of roots have the same real value, and others don't. This leads to the idea of a "complex conjugate pair". And so some pairs of roots of the original polynomial are now different than other pairs.
That notion of a "complex conjugate pair of roots" is therefore not a purely algebraic concept. If you're trying to understand Galois theory, you have to forget about it. Because it will trip up your intuition and mislead you. But in other contexts that is a very meaningful and important idea.
And so we find that we don't just care about what concepts could be understood. We also care about what concepts we're currently choosing to ignore!
Basically C comes up in the chain R \subset C \subset H (quaternions) \subset O (octonions) by the so-called Cayley-Dickson construction. There is a lot of structure.
There is perfect agreement on the Gaussian integers.
The disagreement is on how much detail of the fine structure we care about. It is roughly analogous to asking whether we should care more about how an ellipse is like a circle, or how they are different. One person might care about the rigid definition and declare them to be different. Another notices that if you look at a circle at an angle, you get an ellipse. And then concludes that they are basically the same thing.
This seems like a silly thing to argue about. And it is.
However in different branches of mathematics, people care about different kinds of mathematical structure. And if you view the complex numbers through the lens of the kind of structure that you pay attention to, then ignore the parts that you aren't paying attention to, your notion of what is "basically the same as the complex numbers" changes. Just like how one of the two people previously viewed an ellipse as basically the same as a circle, because you get one from the other just by looking from an angle.
Note that each mathematician here can see the points that the other mathematicians are making. It is just that some points seem more important to you than others. And that importance is tied to what branch of mathematics you are studying.
The Gaussian integers usually aren't considered interesting enough to have disagreements about. They're in a weird spot because the integer restriction is almost contradictory with considering complex numbers: complex numbers are usually considered as how to express solutions to more types of polynomials, which is the opposite direction of excluding fractions from consideration. They're things that can solve (a restricted subset of) square-roots but not division.
This is really a disagreement about how to construct the complex numbers from more-fundamental objects. And the question is whether those constructions are equivalent. The author argues that two of those constructions are equivalent to each other, but others are not. A big crux of the issue, which is approachable to non-mathematicians, is whether it i and -i are fundamentally different, because arithmetically you can swap i with -i in all your equations and get the same result.
> But in fact, I claim, the smooth conception and the analytic conception are equivalent—they arise from the same underlying structure.
Conjugation isn’t complex-analytic, so the symmetry of i -> -i is broken at that level. Complex manifolds have to explicitly carry around their almost-complex structure largely for this reason.
My biggest pet peeve in complex analysis is the concept of multi-value functions.
Functions are defined as relations on two sets such that each element in the first set is in relation to at most one element in the second set. And suddenly we abandon that very definitions without ever changing the notation! Complex logarithms suddenly have infinitely many values! And yet we say complex expressions are equal to something.
Idk, to me it feels much much better than just picking one root when defining the inverse function.
This desire to absolutely pick one when from the purely mathematical perspective they're all equal is both ugly and harmful (as in complicates things down the line).
But couldn't we just switch the nomenclature? Instead of an oxymoronic concept of "multivalue function", we could just call it "relation of complex equivalence" or something of sorts.
Knowledge is the output of a person and their expertise and perspective, irreducibly. In this case, they seem to know something of what they're talking about:
> Starting 2022, I am now the John Cardinal O’Hara Professor of Logic at the University of Notre Dame.
> From 2018 to 2022, I was Professor of Logic at Oxford University and the Sir Peter Strawson Fellow at University College Oxford.
Also interesting:
> I am active on MathOverflow, and my contributions there (see my profile) have earned the top-rated reputation score.
We could've called the imaginaries "orthogonals", "perpendiculars", "complications", "atypicals", there's a million other options. I like the idea that a number is complex because it has a "complicated component".
Honestly, the rigid conception is the correct one. Im of the view that i as an attribute on a number rather than a number itself, in the same way a negative sign is an attribute. Its basically exists to generalize rotations through multiplication. Instead of taking an x,y vector and multiplying it by a matrix to get rotations, you can use a complex number representation, and multiply it by another complex number to rotate/scale it. If the cartesian magnitude of the second complex number is 1, then you don't get any scaling. So the idea of x/y coordinates is very much baked in to the "imaginary attribute".
I feel like the problem is that we just assume that e^(pi*i) = -1 as a given, which makes i "feel" like number, which gives some validity to other interpretations. But I would argue that that equation is not actually valid. It arises from Taylor series equivalence between e, sin and cos, but taylor series is simply an approximation of a function by matching its derivatives around a certain point, namely x=0. And just because you take 2 functions and see that their approximations around a certain point are equal, doesn't mean that the functions are equal. Even more so, that definition completely bypasses what it means to taking derivatives into the imaginary plane.
If you try to prove this any other way besides Taylor series expansion, you really cant, because the concept of taking something to the power of "imaginary value" doesn't really have any ties into other definitions.
As such, there is nothing really special about e itself either. The only reason its in there is because of a pattern artifact in math - e^x derivative is itself, while cos and sin follow cyclic patterns. If you were to replace e with any other number, note that anything you ever want to do with complex numbers would work out identically - you don't really use the value of e anywhere, all you really care about is r and theta.
So if you drop the assumption that i is a number and just treat i as an attribute of a number like a negative sign, complex numbers are basically just 2d numbers written in a special way. And of course, the rotations are easily extended into 3d space through quaternions, which use i j an k much in the same way.
> As such, there is nothing really special about e itself either. The only reason its in there is because of a pattern artifact in math - e^x derivative is itself
Not sure I follow you here... The special thing about e is that it's self-derivative. The other exponential bases, while essentially the same in their "growth", have derivatives with an extra factor. I assume you know e is special in that sense, so I'm unclear what you're arguing?
Im saying that the definition of polar coordinates for complex numbers using e instead of any other number is irrelevant to the use of complex numbers, but its inclusion in Eulers identity makes it seem like a i is a number rather than an attribute. And if you assume i is a number, it leads to one thinking that that you can define the complex field C. But my argument is that Eulers identity is not really relevant in the sense of what the complex numbers are used for, so i is not a number but rather a tool.
We as humans had a similar argument regarding 0. The thought was that zero is not a number, just a notational trick to denote that nothing is there (in the place value system of the Mesopotamians)
But then in India we discovered that it can really participate with the the other bonafide numbers as a first class citizen of numbers.
It is not longer a place holder but can be the argument of the binary functions, PLUS, MINUS, MULTIPLY and can also be the result of these functions.
With i we have a similar observation, that it can indeed be allowed as a first class citizen as a number. Addition and multiplication can accept them as their arguments as well as their RHS. It's a number, just a different kind.
But you can define the complex field C. And it has many benefits, like making the fundamental theorem of algebra work out. I'm not seeing the issue?
On a similar note, why insist that "i" (or a negative, for that matter) is an "attribute" on a number rather than an extension of the concept of number? In one sense, this is a just a definitional choice, so I don't think either conception is right or wrong. But I'm still not getting your preference for the attribute perspective. If anything, especially in the case of negative numbers, it seems less elegant than just allowing the negatives to be numbers?
Sure, you can define any field to make your math work out. None of the interpretations are wrong per say, the question is whether or not they are useful.
The point of contention that leads to 3 interpretations is whether you assume i acts like a number. My argument is that people generally answer yes, because of Eulers identity (which is often stated as example of mathematical beauty).
My argument is that i does not act like a number, it acts more like an operator. And with i being an operator, C is not really a thing.
This completely misses the point of why the complex numbers were even invented. i is a number: it is one of the 2 solutions to the equation x^2 = -1 (the other being -i, of course). The whole point of inventing the complex numbers was to have a set of numbers for which any polynomial has a root. And sure, you can call this number (0,1) if you want to, but it's important to remember that C is not the same as R².
Your whole point about Taylor series is also wrong, as Taylor series are not approximations, they are actually equal to the original function if you take their infinite limit for the relevant functions here (e^x, sin x, cos x). So there is no approximation to be talked about, and no problem in identifying these functions with their Taylor series expansions.
I'd also note that there is no need to use Taylor series to prove Euler's formula. Other series that converge to e^x,cos x, sin x can also get you there.
Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways.
The whole idea of imaginary number is its basically an extension of negative numbers in concept.
When you have a negative number, you essentially have scaling + attribute which defines direction. When you encounter two negative attributes and multiply them, you get a positive number, which is a rotation by 180 degrees. Imaginary numbers extend this concept to continuous rotation that is not limited to 180 degrees.
With just i, you get rotations in the x/y plane. When you multiply by 1i you get 90 degree rotation to 1i. Multiply by i again, you get another 90 degree rotation to -1 . And so on. You can do this in xyz with i and j, and you can do this in 4dimentions with i j and k, like quaternions do, using the extra dimension to get rid of gimbal lock computation for vehicle control (where pointed straight up, yaw and roll are identicall)
The fact that i maps to sqrt of -1 is basically just part of this definition - you are using multiplication to express rotations, so when you ask what is the sqrt of -1 you are asking which 2 identical number create a rotation of 180 degrees, and the answer is 1i and 1i.
Note that the definition also very much assumes that you are only using i, i.e analogous to having the x/y plane. If you are working within x y z plane and have i and j, to get to -1 you can rotate through x/y plane or x/z plane. So sqrt of -1 can either mean "sqrt for i" or "sqrt for j" and the answer would be either i or j, both would be valid. So you pretty much have to specify the rotation aspect when you ask for a square root.
Note also that you can you can define i to be <90 degree rotation, like say 60 degrees and everything would still be consistent. In which case cube root of -1 would be i, but square root of -1 would not be i, it would be a complex number with real and imaginary parts.
The thing to understand about math is under the hood, its pretty much objects and operations. A lot of times you will have conflicts where doing an operation on a particular object is undefined - for example there are functions that assymptotically approach zero but are never equal to it. So instead, you have to form other rules or append other systems to existing systems, which all just means you start with a definition. Anything that arises from that definition is not a universal truth of the world, but simply tools that help you deal with the inconsistencies.
There's more to it than rotation by 180 degrees. More pedagogically ...
Define a tuple (a,b) and define addition as pointwise addition. (a, b) + (c, d) = (a+c, b+d). Apples to apples, oranges to oranges. Fair enough.
How shall I define multiplication, so that multiplication so defined is a group by itself and interacts with the addition defined earlier in a distributive way. Just the way addition and multiplication behave for reals.
Ah! I have to define it this way. OK that's interesting.
But wait, then the algebra works out as if
(0, 1) * (0, 1) = (-1, 0)
but right hand side is isomorphic to -1. The (x, 0)s behave with each other just the way the real numbers behave with each other.
All this writing of tuples is cumbersome, so let me write (0,1) as i.
Addition looks like the all too familiar vector addition. What does this multiplication look like? Let me plot in the coordinate axes.
Ah! It's just scaled rotation, These numbers are just the 2x2 scaled rotation matrices that are parameterized not by 4 real numbers but just by two. One controls degree of rotation the other the amount of scaling.
If I multiply two such matrices together I get back a scaled rotation matrix. OK, understandable and expected, rotation composed is a rotation after all. But if I add two of them I get back another scaled rotation matrix, wow neato!
Because there are really only two independent parameters one isomorphic to the reals, let's call the other one "imaginary" and the tupled one "complex".
What if I negate the i in a tuple? Oh! it's reflection along the x axis. I got translation, rotation and reflection using these tuples.
What more can I do? I can surely do polynomials because I can add and multiply. Can I do calculus by falling back to Taylor expansions ? Hmm let me define a metric and see ...
You made it seem like rotations are an emergent property of complex numbers, where the original definition relies on defining the sqrt of -1.
Im saying that the origin of complex numbers is the ability to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication, and that i being the sqrt of -1 is the emergent property.
> Im saying that the origin of complex numbers is the ability to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication, and that i being the sqrt of -1 is the emergent property.
Not true historically -- the origin goes back to Cardano solving cubic equations.
But that point aside, it seems like you are trying to find something like "the true meaning of complex numbers," basing your judgement on some mix of practical application and what seems most intuitive to you. I think that's fruitless. The essence lies precisely in the equivalence of the various conceptions by means of proof. "i" as a way "to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication", or as a way give the solution space of polynomials closure, or as the equivalence of Taylor series, etc -- these are all structurally the same mathematical "i".
So "i" is all of these things, and all of these things are useful depending on what you're doing. Again, by what principle do you give priority to some uses over others?
>he origin goes back to Cardano solving cubic equations.
Whether or not mathematicians realized this at the time, there is no functional difference in assuming some imaginary number that when multiplied with another imaginary number gives a negative number, and essentially moving in more than 1 dimension on the number line.
Because it was the same way with negative numbers. By creating the "space" of negative numbers allows you do operations like 3-5+6 which has an answer in positive numbers, but if you are restricted to positive only, you can't compute that.
In the same way like I mentioned, Quaternions allow movement through 4 dimentions to arrive at a solution that is not possible to achieve with operations in 3 when you have gimbal lock.
So my argument is that complex numbers are fundamental to this, and any field or topological construction on that is secondary.
"Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways."
I see Complex numbers in the light of doing addition and multiplication on pairs. If one does that, rotation naturally falls out of that. So I would agree with the parent comment especially if we follow the historical development. The structure is identical to that of scaled rotation matrices parameterized by two real numbers, although historically they were discovered through a different route.
I think all of us agree with the properties of complex numbers, it's just that we may be splitting hairs differently.
>"Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways."
I mean, the derivation to rotate things with complex numbers is pretty simple to prove.
If you convert to cartesian, the rotation is a scaling operation by a matrix, which you have to compute from r and theta. And Im sure you know that for x and y, the rotation matrix to the new vector x' and y' is
x' = cos(theta)*x - sin(theta)*y
y' = sin(theta)*x + cos(theta)*y
However, like you said, say you want to have some representation of rotation using only 2 parameters instead of 4, and simplify the math. You can define (xr,yr) in the same coordinates as the original vector. To compute theta, you would need ArcTan(yr/xr), which then plugged back into Sin and Cos in original rotation matrix give you back xr and yr. Assuming unit vectors:
x'= xr*x - yr*y
y'= yr*x + xr*y
the only trick you need is to take care negative sign on the upper right corner term. So you notice that if you just mark the y components as i, and when you see i*i you take that to be -1, everything works out.
So overall, all of this is just construction, not emergence.
Yes it's simple and I agree with almost everything except that arctan bit (it loses information, but that's aside story).
But all that you said is not about the point that I was trying to convey.
What I showed was you if you define addition of tuples a certain, fairly natural way. And then define multiplication on the same tuples in such a way that multiplication and addition follow the distributive law (so that you can do polynomials with them). Then your hands are forced to define multiplication in very specific way, just to ensure distributivity. [To be honest their is another sneaky way to do it if the rules are changed a bit, by using reflection matrices]
Rotation so far is nowhere in the picture in our desiderata, we just want the distributive law to apply to the multiplication of tuples. That's it.
But once I do that, lo and behold this multiplication has exactly the same structure as multiplication by rotation matrices (emergence? or equivalently, recognition of the consequences of our desire)
In other words, these tuples have secretly been the (scaled) cos theta, sin theta tuples all along, although when I had invited them to my party I had not put a restriction on them that they have to be related to theta via these trig functions.
Or in other words, the only tuples that have distributive addition and multiplication are the (scaled) cos theta sin theta tuples, but when we were constructing them there was no notion of theta just the desire to satisfy few algebraic relations (distributivity of add and multiply).
> "How shall I define multiplication, so that multiplication so defined is a group by itself and interacts with the addition defined earlier in a distributive way. Just the way addition and multiplication behave for reals."
which eventually becomes
> "Ah! It's just scaled rotation"
and the implication is that emergent.
Its like you have a set of objects, and defining operations on those objects that have properties of rotations baked in ( because that is the the only way that (0, 1) * (0, 1) = (-1, 0) ever works out in your definition), and then you are surprised that you get something that behaves like rotation.
Meanwhile, when you define other "multiplicative" like operations on tuples, namely dot and cross product, you don't get rotations.
However, the fact remains that rotations can "emerge" just from the desire to do additions and multiplications on tuples to be able to do polynomials with them ... which is more directly tied to its historical path of discovery, to solve polynomial equations, starting with cubic.
i is not a "trick" or a conceit to shortcut certain calculations like, say, the small angle approximation. i is a number and this must be true because of the fundamental theorem of algebra. Disbelieving in the imaginary numbers is no different from disbelieving in negative numbers.
"Imaginary" is an unfortunate name which gives makes this misunderstanding intuitive.
However, what's true about what you and GP have suggested is that both i and -1 are used as units. Writing -10 or 10i is similar to writing 10kg (more clearly, 10 × i, 10 × -1, 10 × 1kg). Units are not normally numbers, but they are for certain dimensionless quantities like % (1/100) or moles (6.02214076 × 10^23) and i and -1. That is another wrinkle which is genuinely confusing.
i is a complex number, complex numbers are of the form real + i*real... Don't you see the recursive definition ? Same with 0 and 1 they are not numbers until you can actually define numbers, using 0 and 1
i*i=-1 makes perfect sense
This is one definition of i. Or you could geometrically say i is the orthogonal unit vector in the (real,real) plane where you define multiplication as multiplying length and adding angles
I have a Ph.D. in a field of mathematics in which complex numbers are fundamental, but I have a real philosophical problem with complex numbers. In particular, they arose historically as a tool for solving polynomial equations. Is this the shadow of something natural that we just couldn't see, or just a convenience?
As the "evidence" piles up, in further mathematics, physics, and the interactions of the two, I still never got to the point at the core where I thought complex numbers were a certain fundamental concept, or just a convenient tool for expressing and calculating a variety of things. It's more than just a coincidence, for sure, but the philosophical part of my mind is not at ease with it.
I doubt anyone could make a reply to this comment that would make me feel any better about it. Indeed, I believe real numbers to be completely natural, but far greater mathematicians than I found them objectionable only a hundred years ago, and demonstrated that mathematics is rich and nuanced even when you assume that they don't exist in the form we think of them today.
One way to sharpen the question is to stop asking whether C is "fundamental" and instead ask whether it is forced by mild structural constraints. From that angle, its status looks closer to inevitability than convenience.
Take R as an ordered field with its usual topology and ask for a finite-dimensional, commutative, unital R-algebra that is algebraically closed and admits a compatible notion of differentiation with reasonable spectral behavior. You essentially land in C, up to isomorphism. This is not an accident, but a consequence of how algebraic closure, local analyticity, and linearization interact. Attempts to remain over R tend to externalize the complexity rather than eliminate it, for example by passing to real Jordan forms, doubling dimensions, or encoding rotations as special cases rather than generic elements.
More telling is the rigidity of holomorphicity. The Cauchy-Riemann equations are not a decorative constraint; they encode the compatibility between the algebra structure and the underlying real geometry. The result is that analyticity becomes a global condition rather than a local one, with consequences like identity theorems and strong maximum principles that have no honest analogue over R.
I’m also skeptical of treating the reals as categorically more natural. R is already a completion, already non-algebraic, already defined via exclusion of infinitesimals. In practice, many constructions over R that are taken to be primitive become functorial or even canonical only after base change to C.
So while one can certainly regard C as a technical device, it behaves like a fixed point: impose enough regularity, closure, and stability requirements, and the theory reconstructs it whether you intend to or not. That does not make it metaphysically fundamental, but it does make it mathematically hard to avoid without paying a real structural cost.
This is the way I think. C is "nice" because it is constructed to satisfy so many "nice" structural properties simultaneously; that's what makes it special. This gives rise to "nice" consequences that are physically convenient across a variety of applications.
I work in applied probability, so I'm forced to use many different tools depending on the application. My colleagues and I would consider ourselves lucky if what we're doing allows for an application of some properties of C, as the maths will tend to fall out so beautifully.
A long time ago on HN, I said that I didn't like complex numbers, and people jumped all over my case. Today I don't think that there's anything wrong with them, I just get a code smell from them because I don't know if there's a more fundamental way of handling placeholder variables.
I get the same feeling when I think about monads, futures/promises, reactive programming that doesn't seem to actually watch variables (React.. cough), Rust's borrow checker existing when we have copy-on-write, that there's no realtime garbage collection algorithm that's been proven to be fundamental (like Paxos and Raft were for distributed consensus), having so many types of interprocess communication instead of just optimizing streams and state transfer, having a myriad of GPU frameworks like Vulkan/Metal/DirectX without MIMD multicore processors to provide bare-metal access to the underlying SIMD matrix math, I could go on forever.
I can talk about why tau is superior to pi (and what a tragedy it is that it's too late to rewrite textbooks) but I have nothing to offer in place of i. I can, and have, said a lot about the unfortunate state of computer science though: that internet lottery winners pulled up the ladder behind them rather than fixing fundamental problems to alleviate struggle.
I wonder if any of this is at play in mathematics. It sure seems like a lot of innovation comes from people effectively living in their parents' basements, while institutions have seemingly unlimited budgets to reinforce the status quo..
The author mentioned that the theory of the complex field is categorical, but I didn't see them directly mention that the theory of the real field isn't - for every cardinal there are many models of the real field of that size. My own, far less qualified, interpretation, is that even if the complex field is just a convenient tool for organizing information, for algebraic purposes it is as safe an abstraction as we could really hope for - and actually much more so than the real field.
The real field is categorically characterized (in second-order logic) as the unique complete ordered field, proved by Huntington in 1903. The complex field is categorically characterized as the unique algebraic closure of the real field, and also as the unique algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 and size continuum. I believe that you are speaking of the model-theoretic first-order notion of categoricity-in-a-cardinal, which is different than the categoricity remarks made in the essay.
I believe the author does talk about the first-order model theoretic perspective at one point, but yes, I was referring to that notion.
A question I enjoy asking myself when I'm wondering about this stuff is "if there are alien mathematicians in a distant galaxy somewhere, do they know about this?"
For complex numbers my gut feeling is yes, they do.
1. Algebra: Let's say we have a linear operator T on a real vector space V. When trying to analyze a linear operator, a key technique is to determine the T-invariant subspaces (these are subspaces W such that TW is a subset of W). The smallest non-trivial T-invariant subspaces are always 1- or 2-dimensional(!). The first case corresponds to eigenvectors, and T acts by scaling by a real number. In the second case, there's always a basis where T acts by scaling and rotation. The set of all such 2D scaling/rotation transformations are closed under addition, multiplication, and the nonzero ones are invertible. This is the complex numbers! (Correspondence: use C with 1 and i as the basis vectors, then T:C->C is determined by the value of T(1).)
2. Topology: The fact the complex numbers are 2D is essential to their fundamentality. One way I think about it is that, from the perspective of the real numbers, multiplication by -1 is a reflection through 0. But, from an "outside" perspective, you can rotate the real line by 180 degrees, through some ambient space. Having a 2D ambient space is sufficient. (And rotating through an ambient space feels more physically "real" than reflecting through 0.) Adding or multiplying by nonzero complex numbers can always be performed as a continuous transformation inside the complex numbers. And, given a number system that's 2D, you get a key topological invariant of closed paths that avoid the origin: winding number. This gives a 2D version of the Intermediate Value Theorem: If you have a continuous path between two closed loops with different winding numbers, then one of the intermediate closed loops must pass through 0. A consequence to this is the fundamental theorem of algebra, since for a degree-n polynomial f, when r is large enough then f(r*e^(i*t)) traces out for 0<=t<=2*pi a loop with winding number n, and when r=0 either f(0)=0 or f(r*e^(i*t)) traces out a loop with winding number 0, so if n>0 there's some intermediate r for which there's some t such that f(r*e^(i*t))=0.
So, I think the point is that 2D rotations and going around things are natural concepts, and very physical. Going around things lets you ensnare them. A side effect is that (complex) polynomials have (complex) roots.
For me, the complex numbers arise as the quotients of 2-dimensional vectors (which arise as translations of the 2-dimensional affine space). This means that complex numbers are equivalence classes of pairs of vectors is a 2-dimesional vector space, like 2-dimensional vectors are equivalence classes of pairs of points in a 2-dimensional affine space or rational numbers are equivalence classes of pairs of integers, or integers are equivalence classes of pairs of natural numbers, which are equivalence classes of equipotent sets.
When you divide 2 collinear 2-dimensional vectors, their quotient is a real number a.k.a. scalar. When the vectors are not collinear, then the quotient is a complex number.
Multiplying a 2-dimensional vector with a complex number changes both its magnitude and its direction. Multiplying by +i rotates a vector by a right angle. Multiplying by -i does the same thing but in the opposite sense of rotation, hence the difference between them, which is the difference between clockwise and counterclockwise. Rotating twice by a right angle arrives in the opposite direction, regardless of the sense of rotation, therefore i*i = (-i))*(-i) = -1.
Both 2-dimensional vectors and complex numbers are included in the 2-dimensional geometric algebra, whose members have 2^2 = 4 components, which are the 2 components of a 2-dimensional vector together with the 2 components of a complex number. Unlike the complex numbers, the 2-dimensional vectors are not a field, because if you multiply 2 vectors the result is not a vector. All the properties of complex numbers can be deduced from those of the 2-dimensional vectors, if the complex numbers are defined as quotients, much in the same way how the properties of rational numbers are deduced from the properties of integers.
A similar relationship like that between 2-dimensional vectors and complex numbers exists between 3-dimensional vectors and quaternions. Unfortunately the discoverer of the quaternions, Hamilton, has been confused by the fact that both vectors and quaternions have multiple components and he believed that vectors and quaternions are the same thing. In reality, vectors and quaternions are distinct things and the operations that can be done with them are very different. This confusion has prevented for many years during the 19th century the correct use of quaternions and vectors in physics (like also the confusion between "polar" vectors and "axial" vectors a.k.a. pseudovectors).
Also, with elementary math: y+ as positive exponential numbers, y- as negative. Try rotating 90 deg the axis, into the -x part. What happens?
I have MS in math and came to a conclusion that C is not any more "imaginary" than R. Both are convenient abstractions, neither is particularly "natural".
We have too much mental baggage about what a "number" is.
Real numbers function as magnitudes or objects, while complex numbers function as coordinatizations - a way of packaging structure that exists independently of them, e.g. rotations in SO(2) together with scaling). Complex numbers are a choice of coordinates on structure that exists independently of them. They are bookkeeping (a la double‑entry accounting) not money
> I believe real numbers to be completely natural,
Most of real numbers are not even computable. Doesn't that give you a pause?
I don't know if this will help, but I believe that all of mathematics arises from an underlying fundamental structure to the universe and that this results in it both being "discoverable" (rather than invented) and "useful" (as in helpful for describing, expressing and calculating things).
Why do you believe that the same mathematical properties hold everywhere in the universe?
Not the person you're replying too, but ... because it would be weird if they didn't.
There are legitimate questions if physical constants are constant everywhere in the universe, and also whether they are constant over time. Just because we conceive something "should" be a certain way doesn't make it true. The zero and negative numbers were also weird yet valid. How is the structure of mathematics different from fundamental constants, which we also cannot prove are invariant.
Complex numbers are just a field over 2D vectors, no? When you find "complex solutions to an equation", you're not working with a real equation anymore, you're working in C. I hate when people talk about complex zeroes like they're a "secret solution", because you're literally not talking about the same equation anymore.
There's this lack of rigor where people casually move "between" R and C as if a complex number without an imaginary component suddenly becomes a real number, and it's all because of this terrible "a + bi" notation. It's more like (a, b). You can't ever discard that second component, it's always there.
We identify the real number 2 with the rational number 2 with the integer 2 with the natural number 2. It does not seem so strange to also identify the complex number 2 with those.
If you say "this function f operates on the integers", you can't turn around and then go "ooh but it has solutions in the rationals!" No it doesn't, it doesn't exist in that space.
In my view nonnegative real numbers have good physical representations: amount, size, distance, position. Even negative integers don't have this types of models for them. Negative numbers arise mostly as a tool for accounting, position on a directed axis, things that cancel out each other (charge). But in each case it is the structure of <R,+> and not <R,+,*> and the positive and negative values are just a convention. Money could be negative, and debt could be positive, everything would be the same. Same for electrons and protons.
So in our everyday reality I think -1 and i exist the same way. I also think that complex numbers are fundamental/central in math, and in our world. They just have so many properties and connections to everything.
> In my view nonnegative real numbers have good physical representations
In my view, that isn’t even true for nonnegative integers. What’s the physical representation of the relatively tiny (compared to ‘most integers’) Graham’s number (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham's_number)?
Back to the reals: in your view, do reals that cannot be computed have good physical representations?
Good catch. Some big numbers are way too big to mean anything physical, or exist in any sense. (Up to our everyday experiences at least. Maybe in a few years, after the singularity, AI proves that there are infinite many small discrete structures and proves ultrafinitist mathematics false.)
I think these questions mostly only matter when one tries to understand their own relation to these concepts, as GP asked.
Given that you have a Ph.D. in mathematics, this might seem hopelessly elementary, but who knows--I found it intuitive and insightful: https://betterexplained.com/articles/a-visual-intuitive-guid...
Related: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18310788
As a math enjoyer who got burnt out on higher math relatively young, I have over time wondered if complex numbers aren’t just a way to represent an n-dimensional concept in n-1 dimensions.
Which makes me wonder if complex numbers that show up in physics are a sign there are dimensions we can’t or haven’t detected.
I saw a demo one time of a projection of a kind of fractal into an additional dimension, as well as projections of Sierpinski cubes into two dimensions. Both blew my mind.
Might you mean an n-dimensional concept in n/2 dimensions?
Even the counting numbers arose historically as a tool, right?
Even negative numbers and zero were objected to until a few hundred years ago, no?
> Is this the shadow of something natural that we just couldn't see, or just a convenience?
They originally arose as tool, but complex numbers are fundamental to quantum physics. The wave function is complex, the Schrödinger equation does not make sense without them. They are the best description of reality we have.
The schroedinger equation could be rewritten as two coupled equations without the need for complex numbers. Complex numbers just simplify things and "beautify it", but there is nothing "fundamental" about it, its just representation.
How does your question differ from the classic question more normally applied to maths in general - does it exist outside the mind (eg platonism) or no (eg. nominalism)?
If it doesn't differ, you are in the good company of great minds who have been unable to settle this over thousands of years and should therefore feel better!
More at SEP:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-mathematics/
> I believe real numbers to be completely natural, but far greater mathematicians than I found them objectionable only a hundred years ago
I believe even negative numbers had their detractors
I like to think of complex numbers as “just” the even subset of the two dimensional geometric algebra.
Almost every other intuition, application, and quirk of them just pops right out of that statement. The extensions to the quarternions, etc… all end up described by a single consistent algebra.
It’s as if computer graphics was the first and only application of vector and matrix algebra and people kept writing articles about “what makes vectors of three real numbers so special?” while being blithely unaware of the vast space that they’re a tiny subspace of.
Maybe the bottom ~1/3, starting at "The complex field as a problem for singular terms", would be helpful to you. It gives a philosophical view of what we mean when we talk about things like the complex numbers, grounded in mathematical practice.
I'm presuming this is old news to you, but what helped me get comfortable with ℂ was learning that it's just the algebraic closure of ℝ.
And why would R be "entitled" to an algebraic closure?
(I have a math degree, so I don't have any issues with C, but this is the kind of question that would have troubled me in high school.)
When it doesn't, we yearn for something that will fill the void so that it does. It's like that note you yearn for in a musical piece that the composer seems to avoid. One yearns for a resolution of the tension.
Complex numbers offers that resolution.
The good news is that Q is not really entitled to a closure either.
Personally, no number is natural. They are probably a human construct. Mathematics does not come naturally to a human. Nowadays, it seems like every child should be able to do addition, but it was not the case in the past. The integers, rationals, and real numbers are a convenience, just like the complex numbers.
A better way to understand my point is: we need mental gymnastics to convert problems into equations. The imaginary unit, just like numbers, are a by-product of trying to fit problems onto paper. A notable example is Schrodinger's equation.
The complex numbers is just the ring such that there is an element where the element multiplied by itself is the inverse of the multiplicative identity. There are many such structures in the universe.
For example, reflections and chiral chemical structures. Rotations as well.
It turns out all things that rotate behave the same, which is what the complex numbers can describe.
Polynomial equations happen to be something where a rotation in an orthogonal dimension leaves new answers.
> In particular, they arose historically as a tool for solving polynomial equations.
That is how they started, but mathematics becomes remarkable "better" and more consistent with complex numbers.
As you say, The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra relies on complex numbers.
Cauchy's Integral Theorem (and Residue Theorem) is a beautiful complex-only result.
As is the Maximum Modulus Principle.
The Open Mapping Theorem is true for complex functions, not real functions.
---
Are complex numbers really worse than real numbers? Transcendentals? Hippasus was downed for the irrationals.
I'm not sure any numbers outside the naturals exist. And maybe not even those.
I've been thinking about this myself.
First, let's try differential equations, which are also the point of calculus:
Now algebraic closure, but better: Next, general theory of fields: I think maybe differential geometry can provide some help here.I was interested in how it would make sense to define complex numbers without fixing the reals, but I'm not terribly convinced by the method here. It seemed kind of suspect that you'd reduce the complex numbers purely to its field properties of addition and multiplication when these aren't enough to get from the rationals to the reals (some limit-like construction is needed; the article uses Dedekind cuts later on). Anyway, the "algebraic conception" is defined as "up to isomorphism, the unique algebraically closed field of characteristic zero and size continuum", that is, you just declare it has the same size as the reals. And of course now you have no way to tell where π is, since it has no algebraic relation to the distinguished numbers 0 and 1. If I'm reading right, this can be done with any uncountable cardinality with uniqueness up to isomorphism. It's interesting that algebraic closure is enough to get you this far, but with the arbitrary choice of cardinality and all these "wild automorphisms", doesn't this construction just seem... defective?
It feels a bit like the article's trying to extend some legitimate debate about whether fixing i versus -i is natural to push this other definition as an equal contender, but there's hardly any support offered. I expect the last-place 28% poll showing, if it does reflect serious mathematicians at all, is those who treat the topological structure as a given or didn't think much about the implications of leaving it out.
More on not being able to find π, as I'm piecing it together: given only the field structure, you can't construct an equation identifying π or even narrowing it down, because if π is the only free variable then it will work out to finding roots of a polynomial (you only have field operations!) and π is transcendental so that polynomial can only be 0 (if you're allowed to use not-equals instead of equals, of course you can specify that π isn't in various sets of algebraic numbers). With other free variables, because the field's algebraically closed, you can fix π to whatever transcendental you like and still solve for the remaining variables. So it's something like, the rationals plus a continuum's worth of arbitrary field extensions? Not terribly surprising that all instances of this are isomorphic as fields but it's starting to feel about as useful as claiming the real numbers are "up to set isomorphism, the unique set whose cardinality matches the power set of the natural numbers", like, of course it's got automorphisms, you didn't finish defining it.
You need some notion of order or of metric structure if you want to talk about numbers being "close" enough to π. This is related to the property of completeness for the real numbers, which is rather important. Ultimately, the real numbers are also a rigorously defined abstraction for the common notion of approximating some extant but perhaps not fully known quantity.
I really know almost nothing about complex analysis, but this sure feels like what physicists call observational entropy applied to mathematics: what counts as "order" in ℂ depends on the resolution of your observational apparatus.
The algebraic conception, with its wild automorphisms, exhibits a kind of multiplicative chaos — small changes in perspective (which automorphism you apply) cascade into radically different views of the structure. Transcendental numbers are all automorphic with each other; the structure cannot distinguish e from π. Meanwhile, the analytic/smooth conception, by fixing the topology, tames this chaos into something with only two symmetries. The topology acts as a damping mechanism, converting multiplicative sensitivity into additive stability.
I'll just add to that that if transformers are implementing a renormalization group flow, than the models' failure on the automorphism question is predictable: systems trained on compressed representations of mathematical knowledge will default to the conception with the lowest "synchronization" cost — the one most commonly used in practice.
https://www.symmetrybroken.com/transformer-as-renormalizatio...
Most commenters are talking about the first part of the post, which lays out how you might construct the complex numbers if you're interested in different properties of them. I think the last bit is the real interesting substance, which is about how to think about things like this in general (namely through structuralism), and why the observations of the first half should not be taken as an argument against structuralism. Very interesting and well written.
It is very re-assuring to know, on a post where I can essentially not even speak the language (despite a masters in engineering) HN is still just discussing the first paragraph of the post.
I began studying 3-manifolds after coming up with a novel way I preferred to draw their presentations. All approaches are formally equivalent, but they impose different cognitive loads in practice. My approach was trivially equivalent to triangulations, or spines, or Heegaard splittings, or ... but I found myself far more nimbly able to "see" 3-manifolds my way.
I showed various colleagues. Each one would ask me to demonstrate the equivalence to their preferred presentation, then assure me "nothing to see here, move along!" that I should instead stick to their convention.
Then I met with Bill Thurston, the most influential topologist of our lifetimes. He had me quickly describe the equivalence between my form and every other known form, effectively adding my node to a complete graph of equivalences he had in his muscle memory. He then suggested some generalizations, and proposed that circle packings would prove to be important to me.
Some mathematicians are smart enough to see no distinction between any of the ways to describe the essential structure of a mathematical object. They see the object.
Would you mind sharing your representation? :-)
To be clear, this "disagreement" is about arbitrary naming conventions which can be chosen as needed for the problem at hand. It doesn't make any difference to results.
The author is definitely claiming that it's not just about naming conventions: "These different perspectives ultimately amount, I argue, to mathematically inequivalent structural conceptions of the complex numbers". So you would need to argue against the substance of the article to have a basis for asserting that it is just about naming conventions.
I'm not a professional, but to me it's clear that whether i and -i are "the same" or "different" is actually quite important.
I'm a professional mathematician and professor.
This is a very interesting question, and a great motivator for Galois theory, kind of like a Zen koan. (e.g. "What is the sound of one hand clapping?")
But the question is inherently imprecise. As soon as you make a precise question out of it, that question can be answered trivially.
Generally, the nth roots of 1 form a cyclic group (with complex multiplication, i.e. rotation by multiples of 2pi/n).
One of the roots is 1, choosing either adjacent one as a privileged group generator means choosing whether to draw the same complex plane clockwise or counterclockwise.
They would never be the same. It's just that everything still works the same if you switch out every i with -i (and thus every -i with i).
There are ways to build C that result in:
1) Exactly one C
2) Exactly two isomorphic Cs
3) Infinitely many isomorphic Cs
It's not really the question of whether i and -i are the same or not. It's the question of whether this question arises at all and in which form.
The question is meaningless because isomorphic structures should be considered identical. A=A. Unless you happen to be studying the isomorphisms themselves in some broader context, in which case how the structures are identical matters. (For example, the fact that in any expression you can freely switch i with -i is a meaningful claim about how you might work with the complex numbers.)
Homotopy type theory was invented to address this notion of equivalence (eg, under isomorphism) being equivalent to identity; but there’s not a general consensus around the topic — and different formalisms address equivalence versus identity in varied ways.
PP meant automorphisms, which is what the OP article is about.
A bit like +0 and -0? It makes sense in some contexts, and none in others.
In the article he says there is a model of ZFC in which the complex numbers have indistinguishable square roots of -1. Thus that model presumably does not allow for a rigid coordinate view of complex numbers.
It just means that there are two indistinguishable coordinate views a + bi and a - bi, and you can pick whichever you prefer.
Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that has a definable complete ordered field ℝ with a definable algebraic closure ℂ, such that the two square roots of −1 in ℂ are set-theoretically indiscernible, even with ordinal parameters.
Haven’t thought it through so I’m quite possibly wrong but it seems to me this implies that in such a situation you can’t have a coordinate view. How can you have two indistinguishable views of something while being able to pick one view?
Mathematicians pick an arbitrary complex number by writing "Let c ∈ ℂ." There are an infinite number of possibilities, but it doesn't matter. They pick the imaginary unit by writing "Let i ∈ ℂ such that i² = −1." There are two possibilities, but it doesn't matter.
If two things are set theoretically indistinguishable then one can’t say “pick one and call it i and the other one -i”. The two sets are the same according to the background set theory.
Agreed. To me it looks like the entire discussion is just bike-shedding.
It's math. Bikeshedding is the goal.
Names, language, and concepts are essential to and have powerful effects on our understanding of anything, and knowledge of mathematics is much more than the results. Arguably, the results are only tests of what's really important, our understanding.
No the entire point is that it makes difference in the results. He even gave an example in which AI(and most humans imo) picked different interpretation of complex numbers giving different result.
Does anyone have any tips on how I would fundamentally understand this article without just going back to school and getting a degree in mathematics? This is the sort of article where my attempts to understand a term only ever increase the number of terms I don't understand.
The whole substack is great, I recommend reading all of it if you are interested in infinity
He's also very active at Stack Exchange
– https://stackexchange.com/users/510234/joel-david-hamkins
– https://mathoverflow.net/users/1946/joel-david-hamkins
There's no disagreement, the algebraic one is the correct one, obviously. Anyone that says differently is wrong. :)
Being an engineer by training, I never got exposed to much algebra in my courses (beyond the usual high school stuff in high school). In fact did not miss it much either. Tried to learn some algebraic geometry then... oh the horror. For whatever reason, my intuition is very geometric and analytic (in the calculus sense). Even things like counting and combinatorics, they feel weird, like dry flavorless pretzels made of dried husk. Combinatorics is good only when I can use Calculus. Calculus, oh that's different, it's rich savoury umami buttery briskets. Yum.
That's not the interesting part. The interesting part is that I thought everyone is the same, like me.
It was a big and surprising revelation that people love counting or algebra in just the same way I feel about geometry (not the finite kind) and feel awkward in the kind of mathematics that I like.
It's part of the reason I don't at all get the hate that school Calculus gets. It's so intuitive and beautifully geometric, what's not to like. .. that's usually my first reaction. Usually followed by disappointment and sadness -- oh no they are contemplating about throwing such a beautiful part away.
School calculus is hated because it's typically taught with epsilon delta proofs which is a formalism that happened later in the history of calculus. It's not that intuitive for beginners, especially students who haven't learn any logic to grok existential/universal quantifiers. Historically, mathematics is usually developed by people with little care for complete rigor, then they erase their tracks to make it look pristine. It's no wonder students are like "who the hell came up with all this". Mathematics definitely has an education problem.
You can do it with infinitesimals if you like, but the required course in nonstandard analysis to justify it is a bastard.
Or you can hand wave a bit and trust intuition. Just like the titans who invented it all did!
The obsession with rigor that later developed -- while necessary -- is really an "advanced topic" that shouldn't displace learning the intuition and big picture concepts. I think math up through high school should concentrate on the latter, while still being honest about the hand-waving when it happens.
You can do it with synthetic differential geometry, but that introduces some fiddliness in the underlying logic in order to cope with the fact that eps^2 really "equals" zero for small enough eps, and yet eps is not equal to zero.
while (i > 0) { operate_over_time }
calculus works... because it was almost designed for Mechanics. If the machine it's getting input, you have output. When it finished getting input, all the output you get yields some value, yes, but limits are best understood not for the result, but for the process (what the functions do).
You are not sending 0 coins to a machine, do you? You sent X to 0 coins to a machine. The machine will work from 2 to 0, but 0 itself is not included because is not a part of a changing process, it's the end.
Limits are for ranges of quantities over something.
IMO, the calculus is taught incorrectly. It should start with functions and completely avoid sequences initially. Once you understand how calculus exploits continuity (and sometimes smoothness), it becomes almost intuitive. That's also how it was historically developed, until Weierstrass invented his monster function and forced a bit more rigor.
But instead calculus is taught from fundamentals, building up from sequences. And a lot of complexity and hate comes from all those "technical" theorems that you need to make that jump from sequences to functions. E.g. things like "you can pick a converging subsequence from any bounded sequence".
Interesting.
In Maths classes, we started with functions. Functions as list of pairs, functions defined by algebraic expressions, functions plotted on graph papers and after that limits. Sequences were peripherally treated, just so that limits made sense.
Simultaneously, in Physics classes we were being taught using infinitesimals, with the a call back that "you will see this done more formally in your maths classes, but for intuition, infinitesimals will do for now".
"The Axiom of Choice is obviously true, the Well-ordering theorem obviously false, and who can tell about Zorn's lemma?"
(attributed to Jerry Bona)
The complex numbers are just elements of R[i]/(i^2+1). I don't even understand how people are able to get this wrong.
Of course everyone agrees that this is a nice way to construct the complex field. The question is what is the structure you are placing on this construction. Is it just a field? Do you intend to fix R as a distinguished subfield? After all, there are many different copies of R in C, if one has only the field structure. Is i named as a constant, as it seems to be in the construction when you form the polynomials in the symbol i. Do you intend to view this as a topological space? Those further questions is what the discussion is about.
I mean, yes of course i is an element in C, because it's a monic polynomial in i.
There's no "intend to". The complex numbers are what they are regardless of us; this isn't quantum mechanics where the presence of an observer somehow changes things.
It's not about observers, but about mathematical structure and meaning. Without answering the questions, you are being ambiguous as to what the structure of C is. For example, if a particular copy of R is fixed as a subfield, then there are only two automorphisms---the trivial automorphism and complex conjugation, since any automorphism fixing the copy of R would have to be the identity on those reals and thus the rest of it is determined by whether i is fixed or sent to -i. Meanwhile, if you don't fix a particular R subfield, then there is a vast space of further wild automorphisms. So this choice of structure---that is, the answer to the questions I posed---has huge consequences on the automorphism group of your conception. You can't just ignore it and refuse to say what the structure is.
Hah. This perspective is how you get an embedding of booleans into the reals in which False is 1 and True is -1 :-)
(Yes, mathematicians really use it. It makes parity a simpler polynomial than the normal assignment).
Obviously.
The way I think of complex numbers is as linear transformations. Not points but functions on points that rotate and scale. The complex numbers are a particular set of 2x2 matrices, where complex multiplication is matrix multiplication, i.e. function composition. Complex conjugation is matrix transposition. When you think of things this way all the complex matrices and hermitian matrices in physics make a lot more sense. Which group do I fall into?
This would be the rigid interpretation since i and -i are concrete distinguishable elements with Im and Re defined.
the title is a bit clickbait - mathematicians don't disagree, all the "conceptions" the article proposes agree with each other. It also seems to conflate the algebraic closure of Q (which would contain the sqrt of -1) and all of the complex numbers by insisting that the former has "size continuum". Once you have "size continuum" then you need some completion to the reals.
anyhow. I'm a bit of an odd one in that I have no problems with imaginary numbers but the reals always seemed a bit unreal to me. that's the real controversy, actually. you can start looking up definable numbers and constructivist mathematics, but that gets to be more philosophy than maths imho.
The square root of any number x is ±y, where +y = (+1)*y = y, and -y = (-1)*y.
So we define i as conforming to ±i = sqrt(-1). The element i itself has no need for a sign, so no sign needs to be chosen. Yet having defined i, we know that that i = (+1)*i = +i, by multiplicative identity.
We now have an unsigned base element for complex numbers i, derived uniquely from the expansion of <R,0,1,+,*> into its own natural closure.
We don't have to ask if i = +i, because it does by definition of the multiplicative identity.
TLDR: Any square root of -1 reduced to a single value, involves a choice, but the definition of unsigned i does not require a choice. It is a unique, unsigned element. And as a result, there is only a unique automorphism, the identity automorphism.
Real men know that infinite sets are just a tool for proving statements in Peano arithmetic, and complex numbers must be endowed with the standard metric structure, as God intended, since otherwise we cannot use them to approximate IEEE 754 floats.
To the ones objecting to "choosing a value of i" I might argue that no such choice is made. i is the square root of -1 and there is only one value of i. When we write -i that is shorthand for (-1)i. Remember the complex numbers are represented by a+bi where a and b are real numbers and i is the square root of -1. We don't bifurcate i into two distinct numbers because the minus sign is associated with b which is one of the real numbers. There is a one-to-one mapping between the complex numbers and these ordered pairs of reals.
You say that i is "the square root of -1", but which one is it? There are two. This is the point in the essay---we cannot tell the difference between i and -i unless we have already agreed on a choice of which square root of -1 we are going to call i. Only then does the other one become -i. How do we know that my i is the same as your i rather than your -i?
To fix the coordinate structure of the complex numbers (a,b) is in effect to have made a choice of a particular i, and this is one of the perspectives discussed in the essay. But it is not the only perspective, since with that perspective complex conjugation should not count as an automorphism, as it doesn't respect the choice of i.
One perspective of the complex numbers is that they are the even subalgebra of the 2D geometric algebra. The "i" is the pseudoscalar of that 2D GA, which is an oriented area.
If you flip the plane and look at it from the bottom, then any formula written using GA operations is identical, but because you're seeing the oriented area of the pseudoscalar from behind, its as if it gains a minus sign in front.
This is equivalent to using a right-handed versus left-handed coordinate systems in 3D. The "rules of physics" remain the same either way, the labels we assign to the coordinate systems are just a convention.
There are 2 square roots of 9, they are 3 and -3. Likewise there are two square roots of -1 which are i and -i. How are people trying to argue that there are two different things called i? We don't ask which 3 right? My argument is that there is only 1 value of i, and the distinction between -i and i is the same as (-1)i and (1)i, which is the same as -3 vs 3. There is only one i. If there are in fact two i's then there are 4 square roots of -1.
Notably, the real numbers are not symmetrical in this way: there are two square roots of 1, but one of them is equal to it and the other is not. (positive) 1 is special because it's the multiplicative identity, whereas i (and -i) have no distinguishing features: it doesn't matter which one you call i and which one you call -i: if you define j = -i, you'll find that anything you can say about i can also be shown to be true about j. That doesn't mean they're equal, just that they don't have any mathematical properties that let you say which one is which.
Your view of the complex numbers is the rigid one. Now suppose you are given a set with two binary operations defined in such a way that the operations behave well with each other. That is you have a ring. Suppose that by some process you are able to conclude that your ring is algebraically equivalent to the complex numbers. How do you know which of your elements in your ring is “i”? There will be two elements that behave like “i” in all algebraic aspects. So you can’t say that this one is “i” and this one is “-i” in a non arbitrary fashion.
There is no way to distinguish between "i" and "-i" unless you choose a representation of C. That is what Galois Theory is about: can you distinguish the roots of a polynomial in a simple algebraic way?
For instance: if you forget the order in Q (which you can do without it stopping being a field), there is no algebraic (no order-dependent) way to distinguish between the two algebraic solutions of x^2 = 2. You can swap each other and you will not notice anything (again, assuming you "forget" the order structure).
Building off of this point, consider the polynomial x^4 + 2x^2 + 2. Over the rationals Q, this is an irreducible polynomial. There is no way to distinguish the roots from each other. There is also no way to distinguish any pair of roots from any other pair.
But over the reals R, this polynomial is not irreducible. There we find that some pairs of roots have the same real value, and others don't. This leads to the idea of a "complex conjugate pair". And so some pairs of roots of the original polynomial are now different than other pairs.
That notion of a "complex conjugate pair of roots" is therefore not a purely algebraic concept. If you're trying to understand Galois theory, you have to forget about it. Because it will trip up your intuition and mislead you. But in other contexts that is a very meaningful and important idea.
And so we find that we don't just care about what concepts could be understood. We also care about what concepts we're currently choosing to ignore!
Exactly.
That is why the "forgetful functor" seems at first sight stupid and when you think a bit, it is genius.
When you think about it, creating a structure modulo some relation or kind of symmetry, is also a kind of targeted forgetting.
The link is about set theory, but others may find this interesting which discusses division algebras https://nigelvr.github.io/post-4.html
Basically C comes up in the chain R \subset C \subset H (quaternions) \subset O (octonions) by the so-called Cayley-Dickson construction. There is a lot of structure.
Is there agreement Gaussian integers?
This disagreement seems above the head of non mathematicians, including those (like me) with familiarity with complex numbers
There is perfect agreement on the Gaussian integers.
The disagreement is on how much detail of the fine structure we care about. It is roughly analogous to asking whether we should care more about how an ellipse is like a circle, or how they are different. One person might care about the rigid definition and declare them to be different. Another notices that if you look at a circle at an angle, you get an ellipse. And then concludes that they are basically the same thing.
This seems like a silly thing to argue about. And it is.
However in different branches of mathematics, people care about different kinds of mathematical structure. And if you view the complex numbers through the lens of the kind of structure that you pay attention to, then ignore the parts that you aren't paying attention to, your notion of what is "basically the same as the complex numbers" changes. Just like how one of the two people previously viewed an ellipse as basically the same as a circle, because you get one from the other just by looking from an angle.
Note that each mathematician here can see the points that the other mathematicians are making. It is just that some points seem more important to you than others. And that importance is tied to what branch of mathematics you are studying.
The Gaussian integers usually aren't considered interesting enough to have disagreements about. They're in a weird spot because the integer restriction is almost contradictory with considering complex numbers: complex numbers are usually considered as how to express solutions to more types of polynomials, which is the opposite direction of excluding fractions from consideration. They're things that can solve (a restricted subset of) square-roots but not division.
This is really a disagreement about how to construct the complex numbers from more-fundamental objects. And the question is whether those constructions are equivalent. The author argues that two of those constructions are equivalent to each other, but others are not. A big crux of the issue, which is approachable to non-mathematicians, is whether it i and -i are fundamentally different, because arithmetically you can swap i with -i in all your equations and get the same result.
What does Terry Tao think?
> But in fact, I claim, the smooth conception and the analytic conception are equivalent—they arise from the same underlying structure.
Conjugation isn’t complex-analytic, so the symmetry of i -> -i is broken at that level. Complex manifolds have to explicitly carry around their almost-complex structure largely for this reason.
Notably, neither `1 + i > 1 - i` or `1 + i < 1 - i` are correct statements, and obviously `1 + i = 1 - i` is absurd.
What do > and < mean in the context of an infinite 2D plane?
Typically, the order of complex numbers is done by projecting C onto R, i.e. by taking the absolute value.
Yes I’m aware. It’s a work around but doesn’t give you a sensible ordering the way most people expect, i.e:
-2 > 1 (in C)
Which is why I prefer to leave <,> undefined in C and just take the magnitude if I want to compare complex numbers.
One is above the plane and the other is below it. ;)
In a word - "true".
In more words - it's interesting, but messy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_order
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_field
> The complex numbers also cannot be turned into an ordered field, as −1 is a square of the imaginary unit i.
My biggest pet peeve in complex analysis is the concept of multi-value functions.
Functions are defined as relations on two sets such that each element in the first set is in relation to at most one element in the second set. And suddenly we abandon that very definitions without ever changing the notation! Complex logarithms suddenly have infinitely many values! And yet we say complex expressions are equal to something.
Madness.
Idk, to me it feels much much better than just picking one root when defining the inverse function.
This desire to absolutely pick one when from the purely mathematical perspective they're all equal is both ugly and harmful (as in complicates things down the line).
Well, yeah, the alternative is also bad.
But couldn't we just switch the nomenclature? Instead of an oxymoronic concept of "multivalue function", we could just call it "relation of complex equivalence" or something of sorts.
Knowledge is the output of a person and their expertise and perspective, irreducibly. In this case, they seem to know something of what they're talking about:
> Starting 2022, I am now the John Cardinal O’Hara Professor of Logic at the University of Notre Dame.
> From 2018 to 2022, I was Professor of Logic at Oxford University and the Sir Peter Strawson Fellow at University College Oxford.
Also interesting:
> I am active on MathOverflow, and my contributions there (see my profile) have earned the top-rated reputation score.
https://jdh.hamkins.org/about/
Whoever coined the terms ‘complex numbers’ with a ‘real part’ and ‘imaginary part’ really screwed a lot of people..
How come? They are part real numbers, what would you call the other part?
We could've called the imaginaries "orthogonals", "perpendiculars", "complications", "atypicals", there's a million other options. I like the idea that a number is complex because it has a "complicated component".
Twisted ? Rotated ?
Honestly, the rigid conception is the correct one. Im of the view that i as an attribute on a number rather than a number itself, in the same way a negative sign is an attribute. Its basically exists to generalize rotations through multiplication. Instead of taking an x,y vector and multiplying it by a matrix to get rotations, you can use a complex number representation, and multiply it by another complex number to rotate/scale it. If the cartesian magnitude of the second complex number is 1, then you don't get any scaling. So the idea of x/y coordinates is very much baked in to the "imaginary attribute".
I feel like the problem is that we just assume that e^(pi*i) = -1 as a given, which makes i "feel" like number, which gives some validity to other interpretations. But I would argue that that equation is not actually valid. It arises from Taylor series equivalence between e, sin and cos, but taylor series is simply an approximation of a function by matching its derivatives around a certain point, namely x=0. And just because you take 2 functions and see that their approximations around a certain point are equal, doesn't mean that the functions are equal. Even more so, that definition completely bypasses what it means to taking derivatives into the imaginary plane.
If you try to prove this any other way besides Taylor series expansion, you really cant, because the concept of taking something to the power of "imaginary value" doesn't really have any ties into other definitions.
As such, there is nothing really special about e itself either. The only reason its in there is because of a pattern artifact in math - e^x derivative is itself, while cos and sin follow cyclic patterns. If you were to replace e with any other number, note that anything you ever want to do with complex numbers would work out identically - you don't really use the value of e anywhere, all you really care about is r and theta.
So if you drop the assumption that i is a number and just treat i as an attribute of a number like a negative sign, complex numbers are basically just 2d numbers written in a special way. And of course, the rotations are easily extended into 3d space through quaternions, which use i j an k much in the same way.
> As such, there is nothing really special about e itself either. The only reason its in there is because of a pattern artifact in math - e^x derivative is itself
Not sure I follow you here... The special thing about e is that it's self-derivative. The other exponential bases, while essentially the same in their "growth", have derivatives with an extra factor. I assume you know e is special in that sense, so I'm unclear what you're arguing?
Im saying that the definition of polar coordinates for complex numbers using e instead of any other number is irrelevant to the use of complex numbers, but its inclusion in Eulers identity makes it seem like a i is a number rather than an attribute. And if you assume i is a number, it leads to one thinking that that you can define the complex field C. But my argument is that Eulers identity is not really relevant in the sense of what the complex numbers are used for, so i is not a number but rather a tool.
We as humans had a similar argument regarding 0. The thought was that zero is not a number, just a notational trick to denote that nothing is there (in the place value system of the Mesopotamians)
But then in India we discovered that it can really participate with the the other bonafide numbers as a first class citizen of numbers.
It is not longer a place holder but can be the argument of the binary functions, PLUS, MINUS, MULTIPLY and can also be the result of these functions.
With i we have a similar observation, that it can indeed be allowed as a first class citizen as a number. Addition and multiplication can accept them as their arguments as well as their RHS. It's a number, just a different kind.
But you can define the complex field C. And it has many benefits, like making the fundamental theorem of algebra work out. I'm not seeing the issue?
On a similar note, why insist that "i" (or a negative, for that matter) is an "attribute" on a number rather than an extension of the concept of number? In one sense, this is a just a definitional choice, so I don't think either conception is right or wrong. But I'm still not getting your preference for the attribute perspective. If anything, especially in the case of negative numbers, it seems less elegant than just allowing the negatives to be numbers?
Sure, you can define any field to make your math work out. None of the interpretations are wrong per say, the question is whether or not they are useful.
The point of contention that leads to 3 interpretations is whether you assume i acts like a number. My argument is that people generally answer yes, because of Eulers identity (which is often stated as example of mathematical beauty).
My argument is that i does not act like a number, it acts more like an operator. And with i being an operator, C is not really a thing.
This completely misses the point of why the complex numbers were even invented. i is a number: it is one of the 2 solutions to the equation x^2 = -1 (the other being -i, of course). The whole point of inventing the complex numbers was to have a set of numbers for which any polynomial has a root. And sure, you can call this number (0,1) if you want to, but it's important to remember that C is not the same as R².
Your whole point about Taylor series is also wrong, as Taylor series are not approximations, they are actually equal to the original function if you take their infinite limit for the relevant functions here (e^x, sin x, cos x). So there is no approximation to be talked about, and no problem in identifying these functions with their Taylor series expansions.
I'd also note that there is no need to use Taylor series to prove Euler's formula. Other series that converge to e^x,cos x, sin x can also get you there.
Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways.
No.
The whole idea of imaginary number is its basically an extension of negative numbers in concept. When you have a negative number, you essentially have scaling + attribute which defines direction. When you encounter two negative attributes and multiply them, you get a positive number, which is a rotation by 180 degrees. Imaginary numbers extend this concept to continuous rotation that is not limited to 180 degrees.
With just i, you get rotations in the x/y plane. When you multiply by 1i you get 90 degree rotation to 1i. Multiply by i again, you get another 90 degree rotation to -1 . And so on. You can do this in xyz with i and j, and you can do this in 4dimentions with i j and k, like quaternions do, using the extra dimension to get rid of gimbal lock computation for vehicle control (where pointed straight up, yaw and roll are identicall)
The fact that i maps to sqrt of -1 is basically just part of this definition - you are using multiplication to express rotations, so when you ask what is the sqrt of -1 you are asking which 2 identical number create a rotation of 180 degrees, and the answer is 1i and 1i.
Note that the definition also very much assumes that you are only using i, i.e analogous to having the x/y plane. If you are working within x y z plane and have i and j, to get to -1 you can rotate through x/y plane or x/z plane. So sqrt of -1 can either mean "sqrt for i" or "sqrt for j" and the answer would be either i or j, both would be valid. So you pretty much have to specify the rotation aspect when you ask for a square root.
Note also that you can you can define i to be <90 degree rotation, like say 60 degrees and everything would still be consistent. In which case cube root of -1 would be i, but square root of -1 would not be i, it would be a complex number with real and imaginary parts.
The thing to understand about math is under the hood, its pretty much objects and operations. A lot of times you will have conflicts where doing an operation on a particular object is undefined - for example there are functions that assymptotically approach zero but are never equal to it. So instead, you have to form other rules or append other systems to existing systems, which all just means you start with a definition. Anything that arises from that definition is not a universal truth of the world, but simply tools that help you deal with the inconsistencies.
Nope. (Just to imitate your style)
There's more to it than rotation by 180 degrees. More pedagogically ...
Define a tuple (a,b) and define addition as pointwise addition. (a, b) + (c, d) = (a+c, b+d). Apples to apples, oranges to oranges. Fair enough.
How shall I define multiplication, so that multiplication so defined is a group by itself and interacts with the addition defined earlier in a distributive way. Just the way addition and multiplication behave for reals.
Ah! I have to define it this way. OK that's interesting.
But wait, then the algebra works out as if (0, 1) * (0, 1) = (-1, 0) but right hand side is isomorphic to -1. The (x, 0)s behave with each other just the way the real numbers behave with each other.
All this writing of tuples is cumbersome, so let me write (0,1) as i.
Addition looks like the all too familiar vector addition. What does this multiplication look like? Let me plot in the coordinate axes.
Ah! It's just scaled rotation, These numbers are just the 2x2 scaled rotation matrices that are parameterized not by 4 real numbers but just by two. One controls degree of rotation the other the amount of scaling.
If I multiply two such matrices together I get back a scaled rotation matrix. OK, understandable and expected, rotation composed is a rotation after all. But if I add two of them I get back another scaled rotation matrix, wow neato!
Because there are really only two independent parameters one isomorphic to the reals, let's call the other one "imaginary" and the tupled one "complex".
What if I negate the i in a tuple? Oh! it's reflection along the x axis. I got translation, rotation and reflection using these tuples.
What more can I do? I can surely do polynomials because I can add and multiply. Can I do calculus by falling back to Taylor expansions ? Hmm let me define a metric and see ...
I think we are agreeing.
You made it seem like rotations are an emergent property of complex numbers, where the original definition relies on defining the sqrt of -1.
Im saying that the origin of complex numbers is the ability to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication, and that i being the sqrt of -1 is the emergent property.
> Im saying that the origin of complex numbers is the ability to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication, and that i being the sqrt of -1 is the emergent property.
Not true historically -- the origin goes back to Cardano solving cubic equations.
But that point aside, it seems like you are trying to find something like "the true meaning of complex numbers," basing your judgement on some mix of practical application and what seems most intuitive to you. I think that's fruitless. The essence lies precisely in the equivalence of the various conceptions by means of proof. "i" as a way "to do arbitrary rotations and scaling through multiplication", or as a way give the solution space of polynomials closure, or as the equivalence of Taylor series, etc -- these are all structurally the same mathematical "i".
So "i" is all of these things, and all of these things are useful depending on what you're doing. Again, by what principle do you give priority to some uses over others?
>he origin goes back to Cardano solving cubic equations.
Whether or not mathematicians realized this at the time, there is no functional difference in assuming some imaginary number that when multiplied with another imaginary number gives a negative number, and essentially moving in more than 1 dimension on the number line.
Because it was the same way with negative numbers. By creating the "space" of negative numbers allows you do operations like 3-5+6 which has an answer in positive numbers, but if you are restricted to positive only, you can't compute that.
In the same way like I mentioned, Quaternions allow movement through 4 dimentions to arrive at a solution that is not possible to achieve with operations in 3 when you have gimbal lock.
So my argument is that complex numbers are fundamental to this, and any field or topological construction on that is secondary.
Maybe.
You disagreed with the parent comment that said
"Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways."
I see Complex numbers in the light of doing addition and multiplication on pairs. If one does that, rotation naturally falls out of that. So I would agree with the parent comment especially if we follow the historical development. The structure is identical to that of scaled rotation matrices parameterized by two real numbers, although historically they were discovered through a different route.
I think all of us agree with the properties of complex numbers, it's just that we may be splitting hairs differently.
>"Rotations fell out of the structure of complex numbers. They weren't placed there on purpose. If you want to rotate things there are usually better ways."
I mean, the derivation to rotate things with complex numbers is pretty simple to prove.
If you convert to cartesian, the rotation is a scaling operation by a matrix, which you have to compute from r and theta. And Im sure you know that for x and y, the rotation matrix to the new vector x' and y' is
x' = cos(theta)*x - sin(theta)*y
y' = sin(theta)*x + cos(theta)*y
However, like you said, say you want to have some representation of rotation using only 2 parameters instead of 4, and simplify the math. You can define (xr,yr) in the same coordinates as the original vector. To compute theta, you would need ArcTan(yr/xr), which then plugged back into Sin and Cos in original rotation matrix give you back xr and yr. Assuming unit vectors:
x'= xr*x - yr*y
y'= yr*x + xr*y
the only trick you need is to take care negative sign on the upper right corner term. So you notice that if you just mark the y components as i, and when you see i*i you take that to be -1, everything works out.
So overall, all of this is just construction, not emergence.
Yes it's simple and I agree with almost everything except that arctan bit (it loses information, but that's aside story).
But all that you said is not about the point that I was trying to convey.
What I showed was you if you define addition of tuples a certain, fairly natural way. And then define multiplication on the same tuples in such a way that multiplication and addition follow the distributive law (so that you can do polynomials with them). Then your hands are forced to define multiplication in very specific way, just to ensure distributivity. [To be honest their is another sneaky way to do it if the rules are changed a bit, by using reflection matrices]
Rotation so far is nowhere in the picture in our desiderata, we just want the distributive law to apply to the multiplication of tuples. That's it.
But once I do that, lo and behold this multiplication has exactly the same structure as multiplication by rotation matrices (emergence? or equivalently, recognition of the consequences of our desire)
In other words, these tuples have secretly been the (scaled) cos theta, sin theta tuples all along, although when I had invited them to my party I had not put a restriction on them that they have to be related to theta via these trig functions.
Or in other words, the only tuples that have distributive addition and multiplication are the (scaled) cos theta sin theta tuples, but when we were constructing them there was no notion of theta just the desire to satisfy few algebraic relations (distributivity of add and multiply).
I just don't like this characterization of
> "How shall I define multiplication, so that multiplication so defined is a group by itself and interacts with the addition defined earlier in a distributive way. Just the way addition and multiplication behave for reals."
which eventually becomes
> "Ah! It's just scaled rotation"
and the implication is that emergent.
Its like you have a set of objects, and defining operations on those objects that have properties of rotations baked in ( because that is the the only way that (0, 1) * (0, 1) = (-1, 0) ever works out in your definition), and then you are surprised that you get something that behaves like rotation.
Meanwhile, when you define other "multiplicative" like operations on tuples, namely dot and cross product, you don't get rotations.
> I just don't like this characterization
That's ok. It's a personal value judgement.
However, the fact remains that rotations can "emerge" just from the desire to do additions and multiplications on tuples to be able to do polynomials with them ... which is more directly tied to its historical path of discovery, to solve polynomial equations, starting with cubic.
Yeah i is not a number. Once you define complex numbers from reals and i, i becomes a complex numbers but that's a trick
i is not a "trick" or a conceit to shortcut certain calculations like, say, the small angle approximation. i is a number and this must be true because of the fundamental theorem of algebra. Disbelieving in the imaginary numbers is no different from disbelieving in negative numbers.
"Imaginary" is an unfortunate name which gives makes this misunderstanding intuitive.
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLiaHhY2iBX9g6KIvZ_703G3KJ...
However, what's true about what you and GP have suggested is that both i and -1 are used as units. Writing -10 or 10i is similar to writing 10kg (more clearly, 10 × i, 10 × -1, 10 × 1kg). Units are not normally numbers, but they are for certain dimensionless quantities like % (1/100) or moles (6.02214076 × 10^23) and i and -1. That is another wrinkle which is genuinely confusing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimensionless_quantity
Yes I agree, I was just arguing against "i=0+1*i so it's by definition a complex number" which is a self referential definition
If you take this tack, then 0 and 1 are not numbers either.
i is not a real number, is not an integer, is not a rational etc.
You need a base to define complex numbers, in that new space i=0+1*i and you could call that a complex number
0 and 1 help define integers, without {Empty, Something} (or empty, set of the empty, or whatever else base axioms you are using) there is no integers
The simple fact you wanted to write this:
i=0+1*i
Makes i a number. Since * is a binary operator in your space, i needs to be a number for 1*i to make any sense.
Similarly, if = is to be a binary relation in your space, i needs to be a number for i={anything} to make sense.
Comparing i with a unary operator like - shows the difference:
i*i=-1 makes perfect sense
-*-=???? does not make sense
i is a complex number, complex numbers are of the form real + i*real... Don't you see the recursive definition ? Same with 0 and 1 they are not numbers until you can actually define numbers, using 0 and 1
This is one definition of i. Or you could geometrically say i is the orthogonal unit vector in the (real,real) plane where you define multiplication as multiplying length and adding anglesAnother "xyz" domain that doesn't resolve on my network.
Yep- there’s some issues representing complex numbers in 3D space. You may want to check out quaternions.
Instructions unclear, gimbal locked
https://web.archive.org/web/20251015174117/https://www.infin...
This one has the paywall, but the main site has no paywall currently.